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“Women Directors”: A Term of Art Showcasing
the Need for Meaningful Gender Diversity on
Corporate Boards
Sonja S. Carlson1
INTRODUCTION
What’s the point in pouring a fortune into educating girls, and then
watching them exceed boys at almost every level, if, when it
comes to appointing business leaders in top companies, these are
drawn from just half the population – friends who have been
recruited on fishing and hunting trips or from within a small circle
of acquaintances?
—Ansgar Gabrielsen, Former Minister of Trade and
Industry, Norway2
While women comprise nearly half of the American labor force,3 looking
to the corporate boardrooms of America’s Fortune 500 companies,4 a mere
1

Sonja Carlson is a 2013 JD candidate at Seattle University School of Law, where she
serves as the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Scholar for the Berle Center on Corporations, Law and
Society. She received her BA in Economics from Columbia University in 2004. A special
thanks to Dean Mark Niles, Professor Charles O’Kelley, Mr. Bob Menanteaux, and R.G.
Carlson Phillips for their support and encouragement.
2
Nicki Gilmour, Why Accountability Is What Matters: Achieving Critical Mass with
Targets or Quotas, GLASS HAMMER (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.theglasshammer.com/news/2010/01/21/why-accountability-is-what-mattersachieving-critical-mass-with-targets-or-quotas/ (quoting Ansgar Gabrielsen, former
Norwegian politician for the Conservative Party who, as Minister of Trade and Industry,
drafted the legislation mandating quotas for gender diversity on corporate boards).
3
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1
(2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-intro-2011.pdf (women comprised 47
percent of the American labor force in 2010).
4
“Fortune magazine’s ranking of the top 500 U.S. incorporated companies filing
financial statements . . . is based on each company’s gross annual revenue. Included in
the list are public companies, private companies, and cooperatives that file a 10-K with
the SEC, and mutual insurance companies that file with state regulators.” NANCY M.
CARTER & HARVEY M. WAGNER, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND
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16.1 percent of directors are women.5 In both 2010 and 2011, less than onefifth of Fortune 500 companies had 25 percent or more women directors.6
Just three companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500)—Avon
Products, Estée Lauder, and Macy’s—have boards in which women hold
more than 40 percent of the seats.7 Furthermore, women hold a mere 2.6
percent of board chairmanships.8 Forty-seven, or 9.4 percent, of S&P 500
companies have no female directors at all, including Discovery
Communications, Inc., co-owner of Oprah Winfrey’s OWN cable channel,
and retailer Urban Outfitters, Inc.9
Such statistics are particularly noteworthy given that the board of
directors is so central to a corporation’s strategic leadership that it is
considered “the epicenter of U.S. corporate governance.”10 While
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2004–2008) 3 (2011), available at
http://www.catalyst.org/file/445/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_and_women’s
_representation_on_boards_(2004–2008).pdf (citing Fortune 500: FAQ Definitions and
Explanations, CNNMONEY (May 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500/2010/faq/).
5
CATALYST, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE (Dec. 14,
2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/publication/219/statistical-overview-ofwomen-in-the-workplace [hereinafter STATISTICAL OVERVIEW] (citing BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, Table 3: Employment Status of the
Civilian Noninstitutional Population by Age, Sex, and Race, Annual Averages 2010
(2011) [hereinafter POPULATION SURVEY]). See also CATALYST, WOMEN IN U.S.
INFORMATION (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.catalyst.org/publication/496/
women-in-us-information [hereinafter WOMEN IN U.S.] (Data from 2011 also reveals that
women constitute only 12.2 percent of executive officers and 3.3 percent of CEOs.).
6
RACHEL SOARES ET AL., CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN BOARD
DIRECTORS 1 (2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/533/2011_fortune_500_
census_wbd.pdf.
7
Joel Stonington, Boys-Only Boards: Where the Women Aren’t at the Top,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 27, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43526947/
ns/business-us_business/t/boys-only-boards-where-women-arent-top/from/
toolbar#.TvotapgW994.
8
Id. (citing Catalyst statistics).
9
Jeff Green, Women Lose Out on U.S. Boards as Europeans Get Quota Help,
BLOOMBERG, June 16, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/womenlosing-out-on-u-s-boards-as-europe-gets-help-from-quotas.html?cmpid=msnbc.
10
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 51 (2008).
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boardroom diversity11 has been a topic of discussion for some time, in
recent years it has been the focus of increasing attention from both
companies and governments.12
Broadly speaking, arguments for increased gender diversity fall into one
of two categories: ethical or economic.13 Ethical arguments present the lack
of women directors in terms of the immorality of gender discrimination,
advocating for increased gender diversity in order to “achieve a more
equitable outcome for society.”14 In contrast, economic arguments are
“based on the proposition that firms which fail to select the most able
candidates for the board of directors damage their financial performance”—
the so-called “business case” for gender diversity.15
Building on contemporary discourse regarding the desirability of
meaningful gender diversity in the boardroom, this article suggests that the
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ought to introduce a more
robust version of its diversity-related 2010 Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements16 to better address gender diversity. Such an amended
disclosure requirement would (1) define “diversity” to explicitly include
gender diversity, (2) require corporations to have a diversity policy in place
and to disclose such policy to shareholders, and (3) potentially require a
nonbinding “say-on-diversity” shareholder vote.

11
While “boardroom diversity” can be used to refer to a broad range of characteristics,
such as ethnicity, gender, age, professional experience, and geography, this article uses
the term to refer specifically to gender diversity in the boardroom.
12
See, e.g., DELOITTE GLOBAL CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, WOMEN IN
THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2011) (on file with author) (reviewing the
approaches of numerous countries to boardroom diversity, which include everything
“from voluntary initiatives, to ‘comply or explain’ initiatives aligned with local corporate
governance codes, to required disclosure about diversity policies, to legal requirements
with specific quotas”) [hereinafter DELOITTE GLOBAL].
13
Kevin Campbell & Antonio Mínguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and
Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 435, 439 (2008).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012).
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Part I examines the available rationales in support of gender diversity,
focusing primarily on the business rationale because it is directly linked to
the dominant model of corporate governance: shareholder primacy.
Included is a discussion highlighting the importance of achieving a “critical
mass” of women directors, as well as the drawbacks of “tokenistic”
appointments. Part II summarizes regulations aimed at boardroom gender
diversity in the international context and examines the SEC’s 2010 Proxy
Disclosure Enhancements. Part III analyzes the scope of the SEC’s
regulatory authority and, in light of the advantages of increased gender
diversity in the boardroom, suggests a more robust version of the 2010
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements. Finally, Part IV engages in a preliminary
investigation of the potentially positive labor market effects that stem from
gender diversity in the boardroom, suggesting that this is an area for further
research.

I. THE BUSINESS RATIONALE FOR GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE
BOARDROOM: FROM TOKEN TO CRITICAL MASS
Delaware, the leading authority on matters of corporate law, mandates
that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors.”17 While there are numerous
corporate governance models, the dominant model today is that of
shareholder primacy—the central role of the board of directors is
shareholder wealth maximization.18 The shareholder primacy norm is
17

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012).
See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278
(1998).

18

Although the shareholder primacy norm has had myriad formulations over
time, the one most often quoted by modern scholars comes from the wellknown case Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
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generally assumed to be “a major factor considered by boards of directors of
publicly traded corporations in making ordinary business decisions.”19 To
the extent that the board’s obligation to maximize shareholder wealth
supersedes or excludes any broader social responsibility—a view espoused
by the late Nobel Prize-winning economist, Milton Friedman—a business
rationale must justify corporate conduct.20
Numerous empirical studies have linked greater gender diversity on
corporate boards to stronger financial performance.21 InterOrganization
Network (ION), an organization advocating for the advancement of women
in the business world,22 contends that “board diversity is no longer a ‘soft
issue,’ but rather is a solid business strategy that leads to a return on equity,

in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote
them to other purposes.
Id. (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)).
19
Id. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the
Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996) (“the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . .
has been fully internalized by American managers”).
20
Thomas Lee Hazen, Diversity on Corporate Boards: Limits of the Business Case and
the Connection Between Supporting Rationales and the Appropriate Response of the
Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. 887, 889–90 (2011) (citing Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, §6
(Magazine), at 32) (Thomas Lee Hazen’s article “explores the limits of the business case,
some of the alternative rationales for increasing diversity on corporate boards, and the
extent to which those rationales provide a basis for the law mandating or encouraging
increased diversity.”).
21
See, e.g., CARTER & WAGNER, supra note 4.
22
About Us: Charged for Boardroom Change, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK,
http://www.ionwomen.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
Formed in 2004, the InterOrganizationNetwork (ION) consists of 14 regional
organizations in the United States representing more than 10,000 women in
business across a wide range of industries. Through ION, these women
combine their energies in advocating the advancement of women to positions
of power in the business world, especially to boards of directors and executive
suites.
Id.
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return on sales, and return on invested capital.”23 According to a recent
report from the Deloitte Global Center for Corporate Governance, including
individuals with a diversity of backgrounds on corporate boards could
“improve these boards’ functioning [because] harnessing strength from a
variety of backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives allows boards to
bring a more diverse perspective to problems.”24
A. Business Rationale
More diverse boards tend to be more highly qualified than less diverse
boards.25 At least in part, this is because greater gender diversity implies
that the available “talent pool” was more broadly considered during
selection processes.26 Given corporate governance’s focus on wealth
maximization, it is unsurprising that selecting “the most able managers and
[making them] accountable to investors” is believed to result in “good”
corporate governance structures.27
While this article does not attempt a comprehensive review of the
ongoing debate surrounding gender diversity in the boardroom, it does
endeavor to discuss some of the key arguments supporting the “business
case” for increased gender diversity in the boardroom. Specifically,
23
Tina Vasquez, SEC Changes Help Women in the Boardroom, GLASS HAMMER, Feb.
2, 2010, http://www.theglasshammer.com/news/2010/02/02/sec-changes-help-women-inthe-boardroom/.
24
DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12.
25
See, e.g., FEEDBACK STATEMENT: GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS, THE FINANCIAL
REPORTING COUNCIL LIMITED 1, 1 (2011), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/
getattachment/ade9464e-2195-4ce7-b99d-dabaec94e870/Feedback-Statement-GenderDiversity-on-Boards.aspx [hereinafter FEEDBACK STATEMENT]; id. at 4 (“low
percentages of women on boards may demonstrate a failure to make full use of the talent
pool”).
26
See id. at 4 (“low percentages of women on boards may demonstrate a failure to make
full use of the talent pool”).
27
Claude Francoeur, Réal Labelle & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Gender Diversity in
Corporate Governance and Top Management, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 83, 84 (2008) (quoting
Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 2 (2001) (1999 Presidential
address to the Econometric Society) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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corporations with diverse boards may enjoy enhanced profitability because
greater gender diversity leads to better decision-making,28 improved
performance of monitoring functions,29 and stronger market penetration.30
The dangers that stem from homogenous boards (i.e., boards with low
levels of gender diversity) were highlighted by the 2008 financial crisis.
Angela Knight, chief executive officer of the British Bankers’ Association,
reflected on these issues: “If boards all look the same, will they end up
making the same kinds of decisions? After the banking crisis, the question
was asked whether there would have been so much groupthink if there had
been broader [female] representation on boards.”31 Richard A. Bennett32
suggests, “[d]uring the financial crisis, we saw examples of boards that
were composed of members who were too similar in background and that
too often may breed ‘groupthink’. Those boards would have benefited from

28

See, e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (“it is argued that diversity
can enhance problem-solving as the variety of perspectives that emerges from a more
diverse board means that more alternatives are evaluated.”).
29
See, e.g., id. at 435.
30
See, e.g., Stonington, supra note 7.
‘It makes no sense not to have diversity on the board,’ says [Aída] Alvarez. At
Walmart, she says, it’s sound business to have women on the board, not least
because more than half the customers and employees are women. The large
public company doesn’t exist, Alvarez says, that doesn’t have women as end
users or investors.
Id. (Dr. Aída Álvarez is a director on the boards of Walmart and Union Bank; she
formerly served as an administrator for the US Small Business Administration);
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 439–40 (“it is argued that greater diversity
promotes a better understanding of the marketplace by matching the diversity of a firm’s
directors to the diversity of its potential customers and employees, thereby increasing its
ability to penetrate markets”).
31
Dalia Fahmy, Women on Board; A U.K. Initiative Puts a Spotlight on the Dearth of
Female Directors and Gets Corporate Executives To Commit To Hard Targets for
Improvement, U.S. BANKER, Mar. 2011, at 32.
32
Richard A. Bennett is Executive Chairman of GovernanceMetrics International (GMI),
a global leader in corporate governance research and risk rating. About GMI,
GOVERNANCEMETRICS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.gmiratings.com/about.aspx (last
visited May 27, 2012).
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having a more dynamic and broad-ranging composition.”33 Others have
proposed that “critical mass”34 is itself a business strategy that can be
employed to combat the type of “groupthink” that contributed to the 2008
financial crisis.35
Assuming that increased gender diversity can be equated with an
increased variety of perspectives—a proposition related to the ensuing
discussion of “critical mass”—then such an increase in gender diversity
means a concomitant increase in the range of alternatives evaluated during a
board’s decision-making process.36 Evaluating a broader range of ideas
implies that boards will both make more informed decisions, and, in at least
some instances, reach substantively better decisions based on ideas that had
previously gone unconsidered. Gender diversity in the boardroom can aid in
the fulfillment of directors’ fiduciary duties because considering a diversity
of perspectives during the decision-making process can help a corporation
achieve optimal long-term and risk-adjusted returns.37

33

Press Announcement, GovernanceMetrics International, GMI Launches Diverse
Director Database (Sept. 26, 2011), available at http://www3.gmiratings.com/wpcontent/themes/gmi/images/pdf/1753gmipr3d.pdf (quoting Richard A. Bennett, Executive
Chairman, GMI); see also FEEDBACK STATEMENT supra note 25 (suggesting that “a lack
of gender diversity around the board table may weaken the board by encouraging ‘group
think’”).
34
Critical mass theory, as articulated by Rosabeth Moss Kanter and Mark Granovetter,
suggests that “the nature of group interactions depends upon size. When the size of the
subgroup reaches a certain threshold, or critical mass, the subgroup’s degree of influence
increases. In other words . . . when the minority group reaches critical mass, a qualitative
change will take place in the nature of group interactions.” Mariateresa Torchia, Andrew
Calabrò & Morten Huse, Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to
Critical Mass, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 302 (2011). See generally ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977); Mark Granovetter, Threshold
Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420 (1978).
35
Gilmour, supra note 2.
36
See, e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (“it is argued that diversity
can enhance problem-solving as the variety of perspectives that emerges from a more
diverse board means that more alternatives are evaluated.”).
37
Press Announcement, supra note 33 (quoting Richard A. Bennett, Executive
Chairman, GMI).
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Having a robust decision-making process can also facilitate a board’s
ability to adeptly perform its monitoring role.38 Such role represents an
important control mechanism in corporate governance.39 The board’s role as
monitor of executive management derives from agency theory.40 Within
legal scholarship, agency theory dominates discourse on the role of the
board of directors.41 Assuming rational, self-interested actors, the separation
of ownership from control inherent in the modern corporate form
necessarily implies that management (i.e., agent) will not always act in the
best interest of shareholders (i.e., principal).42 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner
C. Means underscored the dangers that stem from the separation of
ownership and control.43 They theorized that the potentially adverse effects
for shareholders could be reduced if boards attempted to minimize agency
costs by monitoring management.44 Notably, some scholars highlight a link
between women directors and overall board independence, suggesting that
diverse boards may result in more effective monitoring because “women are
more inclined to ask questions that would not be asked by male directors.”45
38

Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 435.
Id.
40
Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach
To Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 269–70 (2012).
41
Id. (Two other important theories of the role of the board of directors are the “resource
dependency theory” and the “stewardship theory.”).
42
Id. at 270–72.
43
Id. at 270 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 121 (1932)).
44
Id. at 270 (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 43). Agency costs are defined as “the
sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any residual loss, incurred to prevent
shirking by agents.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS
35–36 (2002) (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976)).
45
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (citing David Carter, Betty J.
Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value,
38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003)) (noting, however, that Carter et al. also “point out that a fresh
perspective may not necessarily result in more effective monitoring if female board
members are marginalised and conclude that there is no a priori reason to expect greater
gender diversity to enhance board monitoring”).
39
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Finally, from a broader perspective, as a corporation’s percentage of
female directors becomes more proportionate to its percentage of female
customers and employees, the corporation is better able to understand the
marketplace.46 An improved marketplace understanding can facilitate a
corporation’s market penetration,47 thereby increasing corporate profits and
shareholder wealth. In considering public feedback to proposed
amendments to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Financial
Reporting Council (FRC)48 stated that boards with no, or very few, female
directors “may be weak in terms of connectivity with, or understanding of
customers and workforce.”49 On this side of the Atlantic, Aída M. Álvarez,
a director on Walmart’s board, expressed a similar viewpoint: because
women constitute over half of Walmart’s customers and employees, in
terms of sound business policy, it simply “makes no sense not to have
diversity on the board.”50 Furthermore, gender diversity in the boardroom is
a broadly applicable business policy because all large public companies
have female end-users or investors.51
B. The Statistics
The limited extent of female representation in the boardroom has made it
difficult for researchers to conclusively determine the effects of boardroom
diversity.52 In the United States, for example, it has been difficult to find
46

Id. at 439–40.
Id.
48
As the United Kingdom’s independent regulator, the FRC is responsible for
“promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting to foster investment.” About
the FRC, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org.uk/about/ (last visited
June 4, 2012).
49
FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 4.
50
Stonington, supra note 7 (quoting Álvarez).
51
Id. (summarizing Álvarez’s statement).
52
See, e.g., Charlotte Villiers, Achieving Gender Balance in the Boardroom: Is it Time
for Legislative Action in the UK?, 30 LEGAL STUD. 533, 545 (2010) (“The effect of
diversity has not been fully tested because diversity has not yet been solidly achieved, so
much of the business case is therefore speculative.”).
47
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adequately sized samples of corporations with varying levels of boardroom
diversity. Empirical findings have tended to be mixed: a causal relationship
between gender diversity and firm performance has not been consistently
identifiable.53 A number of recent studies, however, have not only
convincingly established a strong correlation between increased gender
diversity and enhanced financial performance, but have also made a
colorable case for a causal relationship.54
A recent Catalyst55 study found a statistically significant correlation
between Fortune 500 companies’ financial performance and higher levels
of gender diversity in the boardroom.56 Looking to the companies’
percentages of women on corporate boards (WOCB),57 the study compared

53

See e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Showcasing: The Positive Spin, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1055,
1077 (2011) (“The research with respect to the effects of diversity in corporate
boardrooms is . . . mixed and inconclusive.”); see also Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M.
Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the Boardroom,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1079–80 (2011) (suggesting that while increased gender
diversity could “enhance opportunities for collaboration and support . . . other scenarios
are plausible,” especially in light of some women directors’ apparent embrace of their
“first and only” status); Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Re-visited: New Rationale,
Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 861–64 (2011) (finding that while many
empirical studies have found a positive correlation between boardroom diversity and
improved financial performance, other studies suggest that there is no causal link, and at
least one study has suggested a negative correlation); James A. Fanto, Lawrence M.
Solan & John M. Darley, Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (2011)
(noting the inherent difficulties in designing empirical studies that measure the effects of
boardroom diversity on firm performance, emphasizing the “impossibly long: causal
chain between board composition and shareholder value”).
54
See, e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13; see also Claude Francoeur, Réal
Labelle & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance and
Top Management, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 83, 83–84 (2008) (such firms experienced “returns
of 0.17% monthly, intuitively amounting to a 6% return over a 3-year period”).
55
“Founded in 1962, Catalyst is the leading nonprofit membership organization
expanding opportunities for women and business.” About Us, CATALYST, INC.,
http://www.catalyst.org/page/59/about-us (last visited June 4, 2012).
56
CARTER & WAGNER, supra note 4, at 1.
57
For usage of the term “WOCB,” see, e.g., Siri Terjesen, Ruth Sealy & Val Singh,
Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A Review and Research Agenda, 17 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 320 (2009).
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the bottom quartile companies with the top quartile companies.58 It found
that companies in the top quartile outperformed companies in the bottom
quartile in two of the three performance measures—return on sales and
return on invested capital.59 Return on sales for companies in the top
quartile was 16 percent greater than for companies in the bottom quartile;
return on invested capital for companies in the top quartile was 26 percent
greater than for companies in the bottom quartile.60
Of even greater note, companies with three or more women directors
outperformed companies with no women directors at rather astonishing
rates.61 Over a five-year period, Catalyst found that companies whose
boards had at least three women directors had a return on sales 84 percent
greater, a return on invested capital 60 percent greater, and a return on
equity 46 percent greater than companies with no women directors.62
Similarly, a 2002 Canadian study found significant differences between
boards with three or more women and all-male boards in terms of
nonfinancial performance measures, such as customer and employee
satisfaction, and corporate social responsibility.63
Utilizing robust methodology, a recent Spanish study reiterates the
importance of the male-to-female director ratio, while also rebutting a key
criticism of much of the existing empirical data: the lack of established
58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. (The study found no statistically significant difference in return on equity between
the two groups of companies.)
61
Id.
62
The study evaluated financial performance from 2005 to 2009. In order to be placed
into either the “at least three women directors” or “zero women directors” category, each
company needed to have maintained such levels of female representation for at least four
of the five years at issue. Id. at 2.
63
Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 329 (one such difference was that such boards “are
significantly more active in promoting nonfinancial performance measures such as
customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and gender representation, as well as
considering measures of innovation and corporate social responsibility”) (citing DAVID
A.H. BROWN, DEBRA L. BROWN & VANESSA ANASTASOPOULOS, WOMEN ON BOARDS:
NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING BUT THE ‘BRIGHT’ THING, REPORT 341–402 (2002)).
59
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causality.64 The two researchers, Kevin Campbell and Antonio MínguezVera, found that board diversity65 positively and significantly impacts firm
value.66 Notably, “the positive relationship observed between gender
diversity and firm value is due to the presence of female directors affecting
firm performance rather than the opposite.”67 Utilizing panel data
methodology, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera were able to control for
unobservable heterogeneity in the data, something that most published
studies have failed to take into account.68 By employing a causality test,
they were able to account for possible endogeneity in the relationship
between gender diversity and firm performance.69 Their findings suggest
that the effect of firm value on board diversity is insignificant.70 Improved
firm performance is due to increased gender diversity.71

64

See Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13.
Board diversity is defined as “the mixture of men and women.” Id. at 446.
66
Id. at 446–47 (2008) (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera measure board diversity using the
percentage of women, as well as the Blau and Shannon indices).
67
Id. (emphasis added).
68
Id.
The sample for the panel data analysis comprises non-financial firms listed on
the continuous market in Madrid during the period from January 1995 to
December 2000. Due to some limitations in the availability of the data, the
sample comprises 68 companies and 408 observations. The identities of the
directors and the dates on which they were appointed were obtained from the
register of directors of the Spanish Stock Exchange Commission (CNMV),
which provides details of the dates of appointment and termination of the posts
of each member of the board of directors of listed companies. From the
register of directors we also calculated the number of board members. The
accounting data were obtained from the SABI database [System of Analysis of
Iberian Balance Sheets, provided by Bureau Van Dijk]. Finally, the number of
shares and the share prices were obtained from the annual Madrid stock
exchange list.
65

Id. at 441.
69
Id. at 436.
70
Id. at 446.
71
Id.
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A number of other studies have leveraged “critical mass” theory72 in
order to more objectively analyze the benefits flowing from boardroom
diversity when women directors assume more than tokenistic roles. Pax
World Management President and CEO, Joe Keefe, explained that many
companies have viewed the issue of gender diversity in terms of box
checking: “We have one woman on our board now, so we can check that
box off; we have quote unquote gender diversity.”73 Such an approach is
problematic because, as Rosabeth M. Kanter’s classic study of tokenism
and critical mass suggests, in the context of a male-dominated corporate
environment, women have slim chance of being able to exert their influence
until they constitute a significant minority group.74 Recent scholarship has
reiterated concerns about tokenistic appointments. Campbell and MínguezVera explain that “a fresh perspective may not necessarily result in more
effective monitoring if female board members are marginalised . . . .”75
Once women have reached a critical mass, however, they can “begin to
effect organizational changes.”76

72

Torchia et al., supra note 34.
Stonington, supra note 7.
74
Torchia et al., supra note 34 (citing KANTER, supra note 34).
75
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (citing David Carter, Betty J.
Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value,
38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003)).
73

Carter et al. (2003) consider the link between board diversity and firm value in
the context of agency theory, as outlined by Fama and Jensen (1983), and
consider whether gender diversity enhances the board as a mechanism to
control and monitor managers. They suggest that greater diversity may
increase the independence of the board as women are more inclined to ask
questions that would not be asked by male directors. However, they also point
out that a fresh perspective may not necessarily result in more effective
monitoring if female board members are marginalised and conclude that there
is no a priori reason to expect greater gender diversity to enhance board
monitoring.
Id.

76

Torchia et al., supra note 34 (citing KANTER, supra note 34).
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Tokenistic appointments hinder the ability of token directors to contribute
their talents and expertise to the board in a meaningful manner for a variety
of reasons. Specifically, the negative consequences of tokenism include
visibility, polarization, and assimilation.77 First, in terms of visibility,
because the token individual finds herself being watched with high
frequency, she perceives great pressure to perform.78 Second, polarization
suggests that the token individual may experience extreme social isolation
as members of the dominant group heighten their boundaries because they
feel threatened.79 Finally, in terms of assimilation, the dominant group may
force the token individual into a stereotypically defined minority group,
with the unfortunate result of eliding any differences amongst members of
such minority group.80
In order to realize the arguably positive economic effects of gender
diversity in the boardroom, and in light of the potentially negative
consequences of tokenism, attaining a critical mass of women directors in
the boardroom is of primary importance. A well-regarded study by Sumru
Erkut, Vicki W. Kramer, and Alison M. Konrad explored the dimensions of
numerical representation in the boardroom, comparing groups of one, two,
and three women.81 The study found that three or more women directors are
able to establish a critical mass, creating “normalization” where gender is
no longer a barrier to communication, and where women directors are more
likely to feel comfortable, supported, and freer to raise issues and actively

77

Id. at 310.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 322–23 (citing Sumru Erkut, Vicki W. Kramer &
Alison M. Konrad, Critical Mass: Does the Number of Women on a Corporate Board
Make a Difference?, in WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS:
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 350–66 (Susan Vinnicombe et al. eds.,
2008)).
78
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participate.82 When such a critical mass is present, “diversity becomes not a
‘woman’s issue,’ but a group responsibility.”83
In a 2011 study, Mariateresa Torchia, Andrew Calabrò, and Morten Huse
sampled approximately three hundred Norwegian firms in order to analyze
gender diversity in the boardroom and its contribution to firm innovation.84
Recognizing the variety of ways to measure the effects of gender diversity
(e.g., male-to-female ratios, presence of women, and number of women),
the study focused on the number of women directors and, drawing on
critical mass theory, analyzed boards with one, two, or at least three
women.85 The results suggest that “attaining critical mass – going from one
or two women (a few tokens) to at least three women (consistent minority)
– makes it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation.”86 Focusing
specifically on firm “organizational innovation,” which refers to “the
creation or adoption of an idea or behaviour that is new to the
organization,”87 rather than on general measures of firm performance, the
study found that “[o]nce the number of women directors increases from a
few tokens (one woman, two women) to a consistent minority (‘at least
three women’), they are able to effectively influence the level of
organizational innovation.”88
The results of this Norwegian-firm study are consistent with prior critical
mass studies,89 and suggest that having at least three women directors brings
82

Id. (citing Erkut et al., supra note 81).
Id. at 328. (citing Erkut et al., supra note 81).
84
Torchia et al., supra note 34, at 300.
85
Id. at 304.
86
Id. at 300.
87
Id. at 303 (citing Richard L. Daft, A Dual-Core Model of Organizational Innovation,
21 ACAD. MGMT. J. 193 (1978); Fariborz Damanpour, Organizational Complexity and
Innovation: Developing and Testing Multiple Contingency Models, 42 MGMT. SCI. 693
(1996); Fariborz Damanpour, & William M. Evan, Organizational Innovation and
Performance: The Problem of Organizational Lag, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 392 (1984)).
88
Id. at 311.
89
Id. (citing Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31 (1955);
Rod Bond, Group Size and Conformity, 8 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 331
83
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boards to a place of gender diversity in which genuine majority-minority
interactions and processes occur, “thereby enabling the overall board to take
high-quality decisions.”90 In contrast, because one or two women directors
remain tokens, and because they are likely to conform to the majority’s
viewpoints, they do not appear to influence the level of organizational
innovation.91
In another recent study, three professors at HEC Montréal, a wellregarded Canadian business school, sought to compare firm performance
using a model that controlled for each firm’s associated risk level
(something that most prior studies had failed to do).92 Risk level is
particularly important in this line of research because women are “often
appointed to leadership positions under problematic organizational
circumstances”—a situation suggestive of a “glass cliff” in which women
leaders are exposed to high risk of failure and criticism.93 Looking to female
director and officer representation, the Canadian study indicates that when
(2005); Charlan J. Nemeth & Joel Wachtler, Creative Problem Solving as a Result of
Majority and Minority Influence, 13 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 45 (1983); Sarah Tanford &
Steven Penrod, Social Influence Model: A Formal Integration of Research on Majority
and Minority Influence Processes, 95 PSYCHOL. BULL. 189 (1984)).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 308 (such findings are “in line with previous studies showing that if an
individual is faced with the unanimous opinion of a group, that person is likely to
conform to the unanimous ‘majority’ opinion”); see, e.g., Solomon E. Asch, Effects of
Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment, in GROUPS,
LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177–90 (Harold S. Guetzkow ed., 1951); see also Solomon E.
Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31 (1955).
92
Francoeur et al., supra note 54 (“[W]hereas previous works used either raw stock
returns or accounting ratios, we apply the Fama and French . . . valuation framework, in
order to take risk levels into account when comparing firm performances.”); see Eugene
F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN.
427 (1992); see also Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the
Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993).
93
Francoeur et al., supra note 54, at 84, 93 (citing Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander
Haslam, What Lies Beyond the Glass Ceiling?, 14 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. INT’L DIG. 3
(2006); Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Evidence that Women
Are Over-Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions, 16 BRIT. J. OF MGMT. 81
(2005)).
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firms operate in complex environments, such firms generate “positive and
significant abnormal returns” when they have a high proportion of women
in leadership roles.94
Interestingly, because the Canadian study relied on data from 2001 to
2004 in computing average female representation over a two-year period,95
and because the average levels of female representation have increased,
today, the same study might generate even more dramatic empirical results
today. The Fortune 500 corporations that were deemed “high percentage
firms” had a median of 15.4 percent women directors and 20.0 percent
women officers.96 Today, amongst Fortune 500 corporations, an average of
16.1 percent of directors are women.97 Drawing on Torchia et al.’s critical
mass-oriented study,98 recent increases in levels of gender diversity in the
boardroom suggest that corporations with a critical mass of female directors
may be able to achieve returns substantially larger than those suggested by
the Canadian study.
C. Why the Lack of Gender Diversity?
If gender diversity in the boardroom is indeed sound business policy, one
has to wonder why there is so little of it. And, assuming diversity’s
desirability, what should be done to encourage it?
In general terms, both individual and organizational factors contribute to
the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards.99 Research on individual
factors, such as gender-related demographic characteristics, behavior
patterns and types of interaction, and professional experience and
94

Id. at 83–84 (firms operating in complex environments experienced “returns of 0.17%
monthly, intuitively amounting to a 6% return over a 3-year period”).
95
Id. at 86–87.
96
Id. at 88.
97
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 5 (citing POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 5).
98
See Torchia et al., supra note 34.
99
Villiers, supra note 52, at 537 (citing Amy J. Hillman, Christine Shropshire & Albert
A. Cannella, Jr., Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate Boards, 50 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 941 (2007)).
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connections “can yield insight into how specific women advance into the
boardroom, but . . . cannot answer the question of why some firms have
female directors and others do not.”100 Organizational characteristics, in
contrast, can help in understanding the nature of the conditions in which a
board is likely to have a higher level of gender diversity.101
Organizational factors relate to the structures of workplace interactions
and the nature of everyday decision-making.102 Reflecting on low levels of
women in positions of power, many have suggested the existence of a
“glass ceiling.” Professor Charlotte Villiers analyzed the low level of
women directors in the United Kingdom: “the fact that half the workforce is
comprised of women but only around 14% of directors in the largest
companies are women indicates that a glass ceiling exists, preventing
women from progressing to the top of their careers.”103 Professor Susan
Sturm suggests, “the glass ceiling remains a barrier for women . . . largely
because of patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, training,
mentoring, and evaluation, as well as the absence of systematic efforts to
address bias produced by these patterns.”104

100

Hillman et al., supra note 99, at 941.
Women are increasing in number among corporations’ boards of directors, yet
their representation is far from uniform across firms. In this study, we adopted
a resource dependence theory lens to identify organizational predictors of
women on boards. We tested our hypotheses using panel data from the 1,000
U.S. firms that were largest in terms of sales between 1990 and 2003. We
found that organizational size, industry type, firm diversification strategy, and
network effects (linkages to other boards with women directors) significantly
impact the likelihood of female representation on boards of directors.

Id.

101

Id.
Villiers, supra note 52, at 537 (citing Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001)).
103
Id. at 536–37.
104
Id. at 537 (quoting Sturm, supra note 102).
102
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Some contend that there are insufficient numbers of “board-ready”
women who possess the requisite qualifications and experience.105 This may
be partly due to the manner in which directors are recruited. Oftentimes,
prior boardroom or senior management experience constitutes the main
selection criteria.106 Furthermore, traditional recruitment practices are
frequently informal and leverage personal networks, which means “many
directors have been selected from relatively narrow pools of people sharing
common experiences, career patterns and backgrounds.”107 Such
recruitment practices perpetuate the homogeneity, continuing what some
refer to as “white middle-class male dominance.”108
By expanding traditional, narrow recruitment strategies, boards could
facilitate increased gender diversity. A number of elite schools, including
those that follow, have developed director databases comprised of highly
qualified women interested in pursuing directorships: Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University: Center for Executive Women;109
University of North Carolina School of Law: Director Diversity
Initiative;110 and Stanford Graduate School of Business: Stanford Women

105

Amanda Stevens & Alina Humphreys, Merit Demands Quotas: Statistics Suggest It
Makes Good Business Sense To Have Legislated Quotas for Women on Company Boards,
85 LAW INST. J. 83 (2011) (advocating for the implementation of quotas in Australia,
both because companies with female directors perform better and because the severe
underutilization of female human capital is inefficient and inequitable).
106
LAURA TYSON, THE TYSON REPORT ON THE RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: A REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE & INDUSTRY FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE HIGGS REVIEW OF THE
ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN JANUARY 2003 5 (2003),
available at http://www.london.edu/facultyandresearch/research/docs/TysonReport.pdf.
107
Id. at 6.
108
Villiers, supra note 52, at 539 (citing TYSON, supra note 106).
109
Database of Women Directors, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT.: CENTER FOR EXECUTIVE
WOMEN, http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/cew/resources.htm (last visited
Aug. 6, 2012).
110
The Director Diversity Initiative, U. N. C. SCH. L., https://ddi.law.unc.edu/default.aspx
(last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
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on Boards Initiative.111 The Stanford initiative’s homepage states, “The
demand for women to serve on corporate boards has never been greater, yet
those responsible for recruiting new corporate directors claim there aren’t
enough qualified women to fill the spots.”112 The schools that sponsor these
initiatives hope to facilitate increased boardroom diversity by matching
qualified candidates with corporations in search of potential directors.113
Finally, the lack of gender diversity in the boardroom may stem largely
from the fact that directors do not generally find existing board composition
to be problematic.114 In fact, some have argued in favor of homogenous
groups, citing their ability to efficiently reach decisions.115
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s (PwC) 2010 survey of corporate directors
revealed that, when asked about the nominating or governance committee’s
“ability to create a board with a balance of needed skills and diversity,”
nearly three-quarters of directors responded that such committees were
“effective” or “very effective.”116 Only 5 percent of directors gave negative
ratings to committees’ effectiveness on these matters.117 The remaining 20
percent of directors surveyed were neutral on the matter.118 Nevertheless,
less than one-fifth of Fortune 500 companies have 25 percent or more

111

Corporate Boards: Stanford Women on Boards Initiative, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH.
BUS., http://alumni.gsb.stanford.edu/women/corpboards/index.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2012).
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., Database of Women Directors, supra note 109; see also The Director
Diversity Initiative, supra note 110; Corporate Boards: Stanford Women on Boards
Initiative, supra note 111.
114
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY: THE
2010 RESULTS 15 (2010), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporategovernance/assets/annual-corporate-directors-survey-2010.pdf.
115
See, e.g., John A. Wagner III, J.L. Stimpert & Edward I. Fubara, Board Composition
and Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects, 35 J. MGMT.
STUD. 655, 667 (1998) (finding that greater board homogeneity was positively correlated
with higher firm performance).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
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women directors.119 One clear implication of this data is that a majority of
existing directors simply do not view the need for increased gender
diversity in the boardroom as imperative.

II. BOARDROOM DIVERSITY: CONSTRUCTING AN EFFECTIVE
REGULATORY RESPONSE
Transatlantic dialogue is a longstanding phenomenon, and one that has
become increasingly pertinent within the realm of financial regulation.120 In
2002, for example, the SEC and the European Commission launched the
US-EU Financial Markets Dialogue, which aims “to enhance understanding
of each other’s system of regulation, and explore areas of regulatory
cooperation and convergence in the development of high-quality
regulation.”121 Reflecting on the range of international responses to
boardroom gender diversity can facilitate the United States’ ability to
effectively develop its own approach.
In 2005, Norway became the first country to mandate gender diversity on
corporate boards.122 Other nations have since followed suit, introducing a
range of regulatory and legislative initiatives aimed at achieving greater
gender diversity in the boardroom. While governmental involvement has
been quite limited in the United States, the SEC took an initial regulatory

119

RACHEL SOARES, ET AL., CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN BOARD
DIRECTORS 1 (2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/533/2011_fortune_500_
census_wbd.pdf.
120
“The global economic significance of capital markets and their intensifying
interdependence have led U.S. and EU policymakers to recognise the need for structured
dialogue and cooperation with a view to ensuring efficient and credible solutions that
guarantee effective investor protection and a high level of business efficiency.” KERN
ALEXANDER, ET AL., A REPORT ON THE TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL SERVICES
REGULATORY DIALOGUE 5 (2007).
121
SEC Participation in Bilateral Dialogues with Foreign Regulatory Authorities, U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_bilateraldialogs.shtml#us-eu (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
122
DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 14.
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step into the realm of boardroom diversity by introducing enhanced
disclosure requirements in 2009.123
A. Examples from Abroad
1. Hard Regulations
With Norway leading the way, a number of other European countries
(including France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain) have followed suit,
legislating various quota requirements—some mandatory, some requiring
companies to “comply or explain”—in order to achieve gender diversity in
the boardroom.124
a) Norway—Quotas
Ansgar Gabrielsen, the conservative trade minister who drafted the
Norwegian gender diversity legislation, was motivated by the “business
case” to institute mandatory quotas.125 Described as “an archetypal alphamale businessman,”126 Gabrielsen explained his support of the quota
requirement: “To me, the law was not about getting equality between the
sexes, it was about the fact that diversity is a value in itself, that it creates
wealth.”127 After more than two decades of women and men attending
university in equal numbers, and with so many professionally experienced
women, Gabrielsen did not think that the dearth of women directors made
sense; in fact, such qualified women represented a valuable, underutilized
resource in terms of human capital.128

123

Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012).
See id.
125
DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 14.
126
Id.
127
Gwladys Fouché, A Woman’s Place Is . . . On the Board, GUARDIAN, Aug. 10, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/aug/10/workandcareers.genderissues.
128
Id.
124
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While the Norwegian law is commonly thought to require that the boards
of publicly held corporations be comprised of at least 40 percent women,129
the legislation is actually crafted in gender-neutral language and is
substantially more nuanced than reference to a “40 percent rule” suggests.
The overarching theme is that each gender shall have significant
representation in the boardroom. This goal dovetails nicely with critical
mass theory and helps to ensure that women directors are able to bring their
added value to the boardroom rather than fall victim to tokenism.
In 2005, the Norwegian Public Limited Liabilities Companies Act was
amended to state the following:


If the board of directors has two or three members, both
sexes shall be represented;



If the board of directors has four or five members, each
sex shall be represented by at least two directors;



If the board of directors has six to eight members, each
sex shall be represented by at least three directors;



If the board of directors has nine members, each sex
shall be represented by at least four directors;



If the board of directors has more than nine members,
each sex shall be represented by at least 40 percent
directors.130

Public companies had until January 1, 2008, to meet the requirements,
with noncompliance resulting in dissolution.131 While no company has yet
been dissolved for such noncompliance, some companies have opted to
delist and go private.132 Of the approximately five hundred companies
129

See, e.g., Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 321 (“[T]he Norwegian government
requires that boards of directors of publicly held firms be comprised of at least 40 per
cent women . . . .”).
130
DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 14 (“Disclosure of the state of diversity within
the company is also required under the Norwegian Accounting Act.”).
131
Id.
132
Id.
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affected by the law, about one hundred companies opted to delist; however,
according to Norwegian business leaders, the choice to delist was mainly a
result of other legislative requirements that became effective during a
similar time period, rather than a direct result of the quota requirement.133
b) France—Quotas Plus “Comply or Explain”
In 2008, the French amended their constitution in order to permit the use
of quotas with respect to gender diversity on corporate boards.134 In January
2011, the Assemblée Nationale and Sénat agreed upon legislation aimed at
increasing female representation on boards. Similar to the Norwegian law,
the French law requires at least 40 percent representation of each gender on
boards.135 As of May 2012, the law had not yet been enacted in the Journal
Officiel.136 The French law is actually more expansive than the Norwegian
law in that it targets not only public companies, but also non-listed
companies that have revenues or total assets over 50 million Euros or that
have employed five hundred or more persons for three consecutive years.137
Anticipating such legislation, in 2010, AFEP-MEDEF (the French
Private Companies Association and French Business Confederation)
amended its corporate governance code to reflect the 40 percent
requirement.138 While compliance with AFEP-MEDEF’s code is not
mandatory, if a company fails to comply, it must explain such
noncompliance in its annual report.139

133

Claire Braund, Looking at the Big Picture on Gender Diversity, WOMENONBOARDS:
THE NEXT GENERATION OF DIRECTORS, http://www.womenonboards.org.au/pubs/
articles/norway_bigpicture.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (the Norwegian business
leaders expressing this view were those in attendance at the October 2010 Boardroom
Impact Conference in Oslo, Norway).
134
DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 9.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
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2. Soft Regulations
Other countries (including Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom)
have opted for a “soft” regulatory approach, instituting primarily disclosureoriented gender diversity regulations and requiring companies to “comply
or explain.”140
a) Australia
In June 2010, the Australian government reissued its corporate
governance code.141 It now contains recommendations related to gender
diversity.142 Public companies (defined as those listed on the Australian
Securities Exchange) are required to do the following:


Adopt and publicly disclose a diversity policy;



Establish measurable objectives for achieving gender
diversity and assess annually both the objectives and
progress towards achieving them;



Disclose in each annual report the measurable
objectives for achieving gender diversity and progress
towards achieving them;



Disclose in each annual report the proportion of women
employees in the whole organisation, in senior
executive positions, on the board;



Disclose the mix of skills and diversity for which the
board is looking to achieve in membership of the
board.143

140

See id. at 6, 18, 23. Professor Marc T. Moore’s discussion of the “soft” and “comply
or explain” regulatory approaches aids in contextualizing the use of such approaches
today. Marc T. Moore, The End of “Comply or Explain” in UK Corporate Governance?,
60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 85 (2009).
141
DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 6.
142
Id.
143
Id.
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While compliance with the new recommendations is not mandatory,
companies who choose not to comply must explain their noncompliance in
each annual report.144
b) The United Kingdom
In 2010, the FRC reissued the UK Corporate Governance Code.145 It
included a new provision requiring that “[t]he search for board candidates
should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective
criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board,
including gender.”146 Companies must either comply with the provisions or
provide an explanation for their noncompliance.147
The FRC’s interest in increased gender diversity originates in concerns
about “board effectiveness” when gender diversity is low or nonexistent.
Low levels of gender diversity not only contribute to the FRC’s wariness of
“group think,” but also cause the FRC to be concerned that companies’
behavior is inefficient with respect to (1) utilization of the available talent
pool, (2) comprehension of customers and employees, and (3)
encouragement of female employees seeking professional advancement.148
Nonetheless, the FRC is opposed to setting minimum gender diversity
targets as part of the UK Corporate Governance Code: “No matter how it
[is] qualified, embedding a specific figure would inevitably by viewed as a
quota.”149 Nor does the FRC believe that companies ought to focus solely
on gender diversity to the exclusion of other diversity considerations.150 In
144

Id. (Australia’s Corporate Governance is known as the “ASX Corporate Governance
Council Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations”).
145
Id. at 16.
146
Id.
147
Id. Furthermore, while the Equality Act 2010 “gives the government power to make
regulations requiring disclosure of the gender pay gap,” the government’s present tactic is
to work with companies towards increased voluntary disclosure of compensation rather
than to enforce mandatory disclosure. Id.
148
FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 4.
149
Id.
150
Id.
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this respect, the FRC seeks to pursue an arguably holistic conception of
“diversity.”
In May 2011, the FRC issued a consultation document considering two
proposed amendments to the revised UK Corporate Governance Code
(which had gone into effect June 2010).151 After reviewing the public’s
responses, the FRC stated its intention to implement both amendments,
effective October 2012.152 The provision covering board appointments will
require that “a separate section of the annual report . . . include a description
of the board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any measurable
objectives that it has set for implementing the policy, and progress on
achieving the objectives.”153 The section entitled “Evaluation” will specify
“[board] diversity, including gender,” as one of the factors for consideration
as part of the evaluation of board effectiveness.154
B. The United States
1. The SEC’s Diversity Disclosure Requirement
In 2009, the SEC enacted a diversity disclosure requirement.155 The text
of the requirement reads as follows:
Describe the nominating committee’s process for identifying and
evaluating nominees for director, including nominees
recommended by security holders, and any differences in the
manner in which the nominating committee evaluates nominees for
director based on whether the nominee is recommended by a
security holder, and whether, and if so how, the nominating
committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying
nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or the board)
has a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in
identifying director nominees, describe how this policy is
151

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
154
Id. at 6.
155
Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012).
152
153
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implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the
board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy . . . .156
The new rule, which went into effect on February 28, 2010, is designed
“to assess a company’s commitment to developing and maintaining a
diverse board.”157 Public companies are required to disclose the following
in their proxy statements: “whether diversity is a factor in considering
candidates for nomination to the board of directors; how diversity is
considered in that process, and; [sic] how the company assesses the
effectiveness of its policy for considering diversity [if the company has such
a policy].”158 The SEC, however, purposefully opted to leave the term
“diversity” undefined;159 hence, “companies may develop and disclose their
own standards and address matters such as diverse business experience.”160
The SEC’s adoptive release explicates the rationale for adopting the
diversity disclosure requirement.161 Such rationale rests largely on the
“business case” for board diversity.162 In adopting the amendment, the SEC
156

Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2011) (emphasis added).
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC and Corporate
Governance—An Overview in the Wake of Dodd-Frank, Speech at the New America
Alliance Latino Economic Forum (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2010/spch111810laa.htm.
158
Id.
159
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344 (Dec. 23, 2009).
157

We recognize that companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting
different perspectives. For instance, some companies may conceptualize
diversity expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional
experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that
contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity
concepts such as race, gender and national origin. We believe that for purposes
of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define diversity
in ways that they consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined
diversity in the amendments.
Id.

160
Practising Law Institute, Selected Recent Developments in U.S. Securities Laws and
Corporate Finance, as of August 25, 2010, 1849 PLI/Corp 453, 513 (2010).
161
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009).
162
See Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73.
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voiced its agreement with members of the public who had commented in
favor of the proposed amendment requiring additional disclosure of board
diversity: “We agree that it is useful for investors to understand how the
board considers and addresses diversity, as well as the board’s assessment
of the implementation of its diversity policy, if any.”163
Commenters had noted that board diversity information was important to
investors,164 and that it would enable investors to make better-informed
decisions with respect to voting and investing.165 They had also noted “a
meaningful relationship between diverse boards and improved corporate
financial performance,” as well as the fact that such diverse boards can
more effectively recruit and retain employees.166 The financial performance
comment is particularly demonstrative of the influence of the business
rationale on the SEC’s decision to adopt the diversity disclosure
requirement.167 Professor Lisa Fairfax emphasizes that “enhance[d] board
quality and decision making[] [are] two key components of the business
rationale.”168 Additionally, she notes that in recognizing that the disclosure
requirements may encourage boards to conduct more extensive director
searches and to consider a wider range of criteria in their selection

163

Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009).
Id. at 68,343 n.116 (citing letters from Board of Directors Network, Boston Common
Asset Management, CalPERS, CalSTRS, Calvert, Council of Urban Professionals, Ernst
& Young LLP (E&Y), Greenlining Institute, Hispanic Association on Corporate
Responsibility, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, InterOrganization
Network, Latino Business Chamber of Greater Los Angeles, Pax World Management
Corporation, Prout Group, Inc., RiskMetrics, Sisters of Charity BVM, Sisters of St.
Joseph Carondelet, and Trillium Asset Management Corporation).
165
Id. at 68,343.
166
Id.; see, e.g., Comment Letter from Ilene H. Lang, President and CEO, Catalyst, to
164

Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 15, 2009), available at

http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-100.pdf; see also Comment Letter from
Lisa N. Woll, CEO, Social Investment Forum, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/

s71309-55.pdf.
167
Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73.
168
Id. at 872.
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process,169 “the SEC acknowledged that the rule could prompt more
corporations to embrace diversity procedures.”170
2. Reactions to the Requirement: Shortcomings?
Less than one year after the rule went into effect, SEC Commissioner
Luis Aguilar reflected on the kind of information that companies had
chosen to provide pursuant to the diversity disclosure requirement.171 He
expressed dissatisfaction with the substantial number of companies that had
provided only abstract disclosure, such as a statement indicating that
“diversity was something considered as part of an informal policy,” rather
than a “discussion of any concrete steps taken to give real meaning to its
efforts to create a diverse board.”172 He further noted that, “[b]y leaving out
the steps taken and how those efforts are evaluated, these companies . . .
deprive[] investors of information they have demanded.”173
The SEC’s failure to define diversity has been an important aspect of the
developing debate. In some ways, leaving “diversity” as an ambiguous term
is a politically acceptable approach—perhaps even an advantageous one—
as it focuses attention on the business advantages of increased diversity
while indirectly addressing the issue of gender equality.174 At the same
time, however, because there are different types of diversity and because
each company may define “diversity” as it chooses, the current regulation
leaves ample room for corporations to avoid addressing boardroom
diversity in a meaningful fashion. Furthermore, given that there is no
explicit requirement that companies address gender diversity in particular,
169

See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,355 (Dec. 23, 2009).
Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73.
171
Aguilar, supra note 157.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
But see Villiers, supra note 52, at 556–57 (arguing that it is problematic to view
diversity “as the solution to the continuing problem of discrimination” because “diversity
itself does not necessarily eradicate discrimination”—in other words, acceptance of
diversity does not alone signal the obsolesce of discriminatory stances).
170
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even those companies that do value a diverse board may choose to focus on
other types of diversity, thereby neglecting gender diversity altogether.
In its annual survey of corporate directors, PwC focused a number of
questions on the SEC’s new disclosure requirements, as well as on the
importance of gender diversity in the boardroom in general.175 Overall,
directors believed that the disclosure rules were of little value to investors in
terms of defining “board diversity.”176 On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being
“extremely valuable” and 5 being “not at all valuable,” the mean response
was 3.6.177 In a comment letter to the SEC, Professors Lissa Broome and
Thomas Hazen wrote that the SEC should “require disclosure of how
diversity is defined by the nominating committee.”178 They suggested that
requiring such a definition would better address the concerns and interests
of many shareholders, including large institutional investors, who have been
“actively urging corporate boards to consider constructing a diverse board
when making directors nominations.”179 Furthermore, Professors Broom
and Hazen argued that the SEC ought to “require director nominees and
continuing directors to self-report their gender, and race and ethnicity under
the EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity] categories,” noting that many
organizations focused on developing boardroom diversity “spend countless
hours trying to divine this information (with or without the cooperation of
the companies) so that board . . . diversity may be measured.”180
175

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 114. Using a service provider, 10,000
directors from the top 2,000 companies (according to revenue) were randomly selected to
receive the questionnaire; 1,110 directors completed the survey. Id. at 35.
176
Id. at 2.
177
Id.
178
Comment Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome & Thomas Lee Hazen, Professors of
Law, Univ. of N.C., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept.
15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-65.pdf
(addressing whether we should “amend Item 407(c)(2)(V) to require disclosure of any
additional factors that a nominating committee considers when selecting someone for a
position on the board, such as diversity”).
179
Id. at 2.
180
Id.
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There is at least some evidence to suggest that corporations have not
taken a serious view of the diversity disclosure requirement. PwC’s survey
revealed that a vast majority of directors—more than three-quarters of those
surveyed—responded “no” when asked whether “the discussion about the
new proxy disclosure rule on director and nominee experience,
qualifications, attributes or skills cause [their] board[s] to re-think the mix
of directors currently on the board.”181 This suggests that a more robust
disclosure requirement may be needed to encourage corporate boards to
employ procedures that could increase boardroom diversity.
Furthermore, from 2010 to 2011 there was little change in directors’
perceptions of the difficulty involved in achieving gender diversity: slightly
over half of directors believed that it was either somewhat difficult or very
difficult; about one-third of directors thought that it was not at all difficult;
and around 15 percent stated that gender diversity was simply not an
attribute for which they were looking.182 For those directors who believe
that achieving gender diversity is a difficult task, leveraging the assistance
of some of the numerous organizations encouraging boardroom diversity
would be helpful. A short list of such organizations includes Catalyst, ION,
Forum for Women Entrepreneurs & Executives, Director Diversity
Initiative, and the Alliance for Board Diversity,183 as well as the director
databases developed by a number of elite schools.184

181

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 114, at 5.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY
2011 FINDINGS: BOARDS RESPOND TO STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS 18 (2011), available at
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/corporate-governance/assets/annual-corporate-directorsurvey-2011.pdf; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 114, at 24.
183
Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra note 178, at 2.
184
See, e.g., Database of Women Directors, supra note 109; The Director Diversity
Initiative, supra note 110; Corporate Boards: Stanford Women on Boards Initiative,
supra note 111.
182
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III. THE DESIRABILITY OF A MORE ROBUST REGULATION
In light of the business advantages of increased gender diversity in the
boardroom and the apparent shortcomings of the SEC’s enhanced proxy
disclosure requirements, more robust requirements targeting gender
diversity appear desirable.
A. An Enhanced Regulation to Foster Meaningful Gender Diversity
Given that a critical mass of women directors is essential to reaping the
benefits of boardroom diversity, there is strong incentive for the SEC to
enact a more robust diversity disclosure requirement. Commissioner
Aguilar’s expressed disappointment in the type of disclosure provided by
corporations, and the fact that such minimal disclosure fails to provide
investors with relevant information,185 highlights the fact that the existing
requirements may not be sufficient to foster the desired “meaningful
relationship between diverse boards and improved corporate financial
performance.”186
In the last ten years, two important pieces of federal legislation have
brought increased aspects of internal corporate governance under the SEC’s
purview.187 In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) introduced the requirement of a
board of independent directors on the audit committee, while, in 2010,
Dodd-Frank added a requirement that boards have a compensation
committee and that such committee be composed of independent
directors.188 Much of policymakers’ motivation for such requirements was
185

See Aguilar, supra note 157.
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009);
see, e.g., Comment Letter from Lang, supra note 159; Comment Letter from Woll, supra
note 159.
186
Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73.
187
CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 218 (6th ed. Supp. 2011–2012).
188
Id. (Additionally, stock exchanges require that boards “have an overall majority of
independent directors and that the nominating/governance committee, as well as the audit
and compensation committee . . . be made up of independent directors.”).
186
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their belief that “independence on corporate boards is important to good
corporate governance.”189 Professor Hazen has suggested, hypothetically,
that if the business case for increased gender diversity was empirically
strong enough, there might be an argument that the SEC “should require
diversity on boards, just as publicly held corporations must have a
significant number of independent directors.”190 This is not yet the reality.
Furthermore, European-style quotas tend to run counter to American
antidiscrimination laws191 and the prevalent American viewpoint that the
“operational flexibility and dynamism” associated with lower levels of
market regulation are beneficial in economic terms.192 It is, therefore,
unlikely that the time has arrived when quota requirements would be able to
garner widespread support.
Nonetheless, there are numerous ways in which the existing requirement
could be strengthened to encourage genuine gender diversity. First, the SEC
ought to define “diversity,” and in that definition specifically include gender
diversity. Second, the SEC ought to require corporations to have a diversity
policy and to disclose that policy. Third, the SEC ought to consider
189

Hazen, supra note 20, at 893.
Id. at 892–93.
191
See, e.g., id. at 893 (“In addition, a social justice rationale for board diversity may
encourage corporations to increase diversity, but it is not so strong as to have convinced
policy makers to apply the antidiscrimination laws to corporate boards.”).
192
Moore, supra note 140, at 85.
190

[T]he history of corporate and financial regulation in the UK can best be
depicted as an ongoing contest between: on the one hand, institutional
investors and boards favouring the preservation of operational flexibility and
dynamism; and, on the other, a democratic state striving to ensure the public
accountability of a sector whose activities have profound (albeit seldom
understood) implications for the country’s “real” economy and society.
Id. While Professor Moore’s discussion centers on the history of corporate and financial
regulation in the UK, he notes that a similar analysis is applicable with respect to the
development of systems of corporate and financial regulation in the United States, and
refers readers to David Skeel’s book. Id.; see DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY
CAME FROM (2005).
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introducing a nonbinding “say-on-diversity” requirement similar to DoddFrank’s “say-on-pay” requirement.
1. The SEC Should Define “Diversity” to Include “Gender Diversity”
As previously discussed, the failure to define “diversity” robs investors of
the meaningful information that they desire.193 Moreover, leaving the term
undefined also implies a failure to hold corporate boards accountable for
their efforts to further diversity in the boardroom. From Professor Hazen’s
point of view, the SEC’s failure to define diversity is “potentially
devastating” to the disclosure requirement.194 He says that such failure
“could limit significantly the ability of the SEC’s new rule to alter the status
quo with respect to racial and gender diversity on boards.”195
Specifically, the SEC regulation undoubtedly needs to articulate “gender”
within the definition of “diversity.” Recent developments in the United
Kingdom suggest the desirability of explicitly defining gender diversity as
part of board diversity. With respect to both evaluation of board
effectiveness and description of diversity policies, the FRC has amended the
revised UK Corporate Governance Code to employ the phrase, “diversity,
including gender.”196 While there was some debate over whether to narrow
193

Hazen, supra note 20, at 896 (citing Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra
note 178).
194
Fairfax, supra note 53, at 874–75.
195
Id.
196
FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 5–6. The revised provision B.2.4 will read:
A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the
nomination committee, including the process it has used in relation to board
appointments. This section should include a description of the board’s policy
on diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has set for
implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the objectives. An
explanation should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open
advertising has been used in the appointment of a chairman or a non-executive
director.
Id. The new supporting principle B.6 will read: “Evaluation of the board should consider
the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company on the
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or broaden this definition of “diversity,” the FRC ultimately decided that
while “companies should not focus purely on gender at the expense of other
aspects of diversity[,] . . . adding specific reference to other aspects of
diversity could result in the Code provision becoming a long, unhelpful, list
of such attributes.”197 The wording of the current SEC disclosure
requirement could easily be amended in a similar fashion, replacing
“diversity” with “diversity, including gender.”
2. The SEC Should Require a Diversity Policy and Disclosure of Such
Policy
Companies are not currently required to have a diversity policy in
place.198 Professor Fairfax points out that “the lack of such a requirement
undermines the rule’s ability to influence adoption of diversity policies.”199
The rule requires policy-related disclosure only if a board has chosen (of its
own volition) to institute a diversity policy; in such cases, the board must
describe how the policy is implemented and how the board assesses its
effectiveness.200 Somewhat surprisingly, there is no requirement that the
board disclose the policy itself.201 The board is only required to disclose
“whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers
diversity in identifying nominees for directors.”202
The existing policy-related disclosure requirement may actually
discourage, rather than encourage, corporations from developing a policy.
Somewhat perversely, if a corporation does not have a written policy, it

board, its diversity, including gender, how the board works together as a unit, and other
factors relevant to its effectiveness.” Id.
197
Id. at 4.
198
Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012).
199
Fairfax, supra note 52, at 875. (Professor Fairfax, nonetheless, acknowledges that “it
may be inappropriate for the SEC to require corporations to consider diversity in their
board structure.”).
200
Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012).
201
Id.
202
Id.
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need not make any disclosures. If it does have a policy, however, it must go
to the trouble of explaining the policy, and expose itself to criticism about
the implementation or effectiveness of the policy. In contrast, the UK
Corporate Governance Code requires companies to have a diversity policy
in place.203 The SEC’s requirement would be more effective if it were
amended to require companies to have a diversity policy and to disclose it.
Finally, given that corporations would be required to have diversity
policies, there is uncertainty regarding the substantive content of such
policies. There is an argument to be made for the SEC setting out some key
elements for inclusion in corporations’ diversity policies—such oversight
might help ensure effectiveness. Nonetheless, there is also a real danger that
setting requirements or targets would unduly infringe upon a board’s ability
to effectively direct and manage corporate operations, a domain that has
traditionally been left to state law. In the United Kingdom, the FRC
declined to set measurable objectives (i.e., a series of targets) for either to
overall diversity or gender diversity per se.204 In its feedback statement, the
FRC specified that, instead, “boards should report on what steps they are
taking to achieve the diversity necessary to maximise the effectiveness of
the board, and as part of that what consideration they have given to gender
balance.”205
3. The SEC Should Consider Introducing a Nonbinding “Say-onDiversity” Shareholder Vote
Perhaps a preferable way to hold boards accountable for the substance of
their diversity policies would be to implement a nonbinding “say-ondiversity” vote, similar to Dodd-Frank’s nonbinding shareholder “say-on-

203

FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 5–6.
Id. at 4.
Id. (The UK Corporate Governance Code does, however, employ a “comply or
explain” approach with regard to whether the board used either an external search
consultancy or open advertising in appointing a chairman or non-executive director.).

204
205
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pay” vote.206 Dodd-Frank requires enhanced disclosure with respect to
executive compensation.207 Section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act
(SEA) now mandates that boards elicit a nonbinding shareholder vote on
executive compensation at least once every three years.208 While these votes
are advisory only, “companies typically adjust their pay practices after
defeat or in response to pressure from institutional shareholders and proxy
advising firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services.”209
Reflecting on the first year of mandatory say-on-pay, experts concur that
both shareholders and corporations take these advisory votes seriously.210
According to Patrick Quick, a partner at Foley & Lardner LLP, say-on-pay
votes are “real votes that shareholders take very seriously, and
[shareholders] will look closely at how public companies respond to what is
communicated in the say-on-pay votes.”211 A recent study conducted by
The Conference Board, NASDAQ, and the Rock Center for Corporate
Governance at Stanford University clearly demonstrates that “companies do
respond to the SOP [say-on-pay] policies adopted by proxy advisory
firms. . . . All areas of the compensation program are affected, including
disclosure, guidelines, and plan structure and design—although the degree
to which these areas are affected varies considerably.”212

206

See generally Practising Law Institute, supra note 160.
O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 218.
208
Id.
209
Id. (citing Joann S. Lublin, Pay Starts to Bend to Advisory Votes, WALL ST. J., July
29, 2011, at C3).
210
See, e.g., Talking Points: Say-on-Pay Best Practices in 2012, BOARDMEMBER.COM
(Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.boardmember.com/Article_Details.aspx?id=7227; see also
Elizabeth Pfeuti, Say-on-Pay Votes Are ‘Working’, AICIO (Mar. 29, 2012, 7:32 AM),
http://www.ai-cio.com/channel/NEWSMAKERS/Say-onPay_Votes_Are_’Working’.html; Charles Nathan, James D.C. Barrall & Alice Chung,
Say on Pay 2011: Proxy Advisors on Course for Hegemony, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 28, 2011,
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4467_1.pdf.
211
Talking Points, supra note 210, at 1.
212
DAVID F. LARCKER, ALLAN L. MCCALL & BRIAN TAYAN, THE INFLUENCE OF PROXY
ADVISORY FIRM VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAY-ON-PAY VOTES AND EXECUTIVE
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With regard to best practices, Quick suggests that corporations ought to
include a description of their pay for performance policy.213 This is
particularly important considering that, while the large majority of say-onpay votes were positive, at least nine lawsuits have been filed that “alleg[e]
breach of fiduciary duty in cases where a board of directors approved an
executive compensation package that was rejected by the shareholders in an
advisory vote.”214 Of these lawsuits, one US district court has upheld a
claim grounded in a negative say-on-pay vote at the pleading stages.215 The
failure to clearly describe their compensation schemes left companies
vulnerable to allegations that they inaccurately deemed their compensation
schemes as pay for performance.216 Even if much, or all, of the say-on-pay
litigation is ultimately unsuccessful, the mere prospect of litigation, and the
concomitant potential for shareholder alienation, encourages companies to
COMPENSATION DECISIONS 6 (2012), available at https://www.conferenceboard.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N5-12.pdf&type=subsite.
213
Talking Points, supra note 210, at 2.
214
Michael J. McNamara, Occupying the Boardroom: Increasing Government Regulation
and Growing Public Anger, in EMPLOYMENT LAW: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 2–4 (Aspatore rev. ed. 2012). “While DoddFrank explicitly provides that ‘say on pay’ votes are non-binding and do not create or
imply any change or addition to the fiduciary duties of an issuer or its board of directors,
companies that underestimate the importance of such votes do so at their own peril.” Id.
at 2.
215
Id. at 3.
In NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, et al., No. 11-CV-0451, 2011 WL
4383368 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011), a federal judge in Ohio denied a motion
to dismiss a ‘say on pay’ complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty. . . . The
Court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that he directors of the
company approved the pay plan in violation of the company’s pay for
performance policy, that the pay plan was not in the best interests of the
shareholders, and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion sufficient at he
pleading stage to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule.
The specific evidence the Court pointed to as support for the claim that the
compensation policy was not in the best interests of the shareholders was the
negative advisory vote.
Id.
216

Talking Points, supra note 210, at 2.
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take measures to secure favorable shareholder votes on executive
compensation packages.217
The apparent efficacy of say-on-pay votes in influencing corporate
executive compensation policies provides strong support for the proposition
that a say-on-diversity requirement would help make companies
accountable to shareholders in terms of their commitment to meaningful
gender diversity in the boardroom. A say-on-diversity vote would help
address concerns that the existing disclosure requirements fail to ensure that
shareholders, particularly large and influential ones, are provided with the
information they desire in order to make effective and informed decisions
about financial investments.218 Importantly, given the dominance of the
shareholder primacy model, such an approach would empower shareholders
without running the risk of overregulation by the federal government into a
domain better left either to the forces of market self-regulation or to the
states.
If shareholders were dissatisfied with the board’s policies, they could also
choose to encourage the board to adopt discrete measures such as “the
criteria used when recruiting directors, or the steps taken to develop senior
executive talent,”219 or how the nominating committee’s consideration of
diversity has impacted its recruitment process.220
Notably, in its 2010 report on corporate governance policy, Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc., recommended votes in favor of shareholder
proposals requesting “reports on efforts to diversify the board” and, on a
case-by-case basis, in favor of proposals requesting increases in “the

217

See id.
See Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra note 178, at 2.
219
Boardroom Diversity, GOVERNANCE NEWSL., June 2011, at 3 (identifying key
elements that the FRC considered including in the Corporate Governance Code’s
diversity provisions).
220
Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra note 178, at 1.
218
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representation of women and minorities on the board.”221 Such
recommendations support the notion that shareholders can effectively hold
corporations accountable for implementing meaningful policies aimed at
promoting gender diversity in the boardroom.
B. Would It Hold Up?
Given the current trend of increased regulation by the SEC (e.g., SOX
and Dodd-Frank), the SEC would arguably be acting well within its scope
of authority if it adopted a more robust regulation, as described in the
preceding section. Nonetheless, particularly in light of the 2008 financial
crisis, it is quite informative to take a step back and consider the SEC’s
origins and its mandate in order to contextualize the present day nature of
the SEC’s authority as relevant to regulation of boardroom composition.
1. The Creation of the SEC: “All We Ask of Them Is to Tell the
Truth”222
In the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress enacted the
Securities Act of 1933 and the SEA of 1934.223 In a February 1934 message
to the Senate, President Franklin D. Roosevelt underscored the need for
federal regulation in order to eliminate securities market abuses:
[O]utside the field of legitimate investment naked speculation has
been made far too easy for those who could and for those who
could not afford to gamble. . . . I therefore recommend to the
221

Practising Law Institute, supra note 160, at 524–25 (citing ISS’s U.S. Corporate
Governance Policy: 2010 Updates). ISS is a leading provider of corporate governance
solutions to the financial community. See About ISS, ISSGOVERNANCE.COM,
http://www.issgovernance.com/about (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
222
H.R. 9323, 78 CONG. REC. 8160–8203 (May 7, 1934) (statement of Sen. Duncan U.
Fletcher), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) [hereinafter 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
223
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (Today, the SEA
requires that all companies with “more than $10 million in assets whose securities are
held by more than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic reports.”).
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Congress the enactment of [the SEA] . . . for the protection of
investors, for the safeguarding of values, and, so far as it may be
possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and
destructive speculation.224
Today, the importance of protecting the national welfare is reflected in
the SEA’s introductory paragraph: because transactions in securities “are
effected with a national public interest . . . it [is] necessary to provide for
regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters
related thereto . . . .”225 In general terms, the SEA identifies and prohibits
certain types of conduct within the securities industry, including corporate
reporting, proxy solicitations, tender offers, insider trading, and registration
of exchanges, associations, and others.226 Importantly, the SEA also created
the SEC, vesting it with broad enforcement and regulatory authority.227
Initially, the SEA was to be administered by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC); however, the Senate ultimately prevailed in its desire to
establish an independent commission.228 Senate discussions on this matter
underscore the pioneering aims of the SEA and the marked importance of
the commission responsible for enforcement of such broad aims. Describing
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency’s rationale for
recommending an independent commission, Committee Chairman Duncan
U. Fletcher229 reported that those representing the exchanges argued that the
224
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http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
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78 CONG. REC. 10,248–10,269 (June 1, 1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 222; see also The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 223
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administration of the SEA “ought to be handled by people who have
knowledge of transactions involving the distribution and issuance of
securities, and so forth,” and that the FTC lacked such experience.230
Senator Alben W. Barkley added that the Committee on Banking and
Currency was also motivated by the “public attention [that] would always
be focused upon [a] separate commission,” while, if administered by the
FTC, enforcement of the SEA “would have to be a sort of lean-to under the
Commissions’ original activities.”231 Hence, the SEC was seen as
advantageous not only because of the expertise of its commissioners, but
also because of the degree to which the public would be able to hold such a
free-standing commission accountable to its mandate.232
While the SEA was aimed at correcting abuses, restoring confidence, and
establishing “an efficient, adequate, open, and free market for the purchase
and sale of securities,” the associated mandatory disclosure of “all material
facts . . . essential to give the investor an adequate opportunity to evaluate
his investment” initially evoked some degree of criticism.233 Critics argued
that corporations were being put to “enormous expense and trouble,” and
that the federal government was “inquiring into affairs into which [it had]
no business to examine.”234 Senator Fletcher powerfully countered such
critiques: “What right have brokers to appeal to the public to buy their
2012). He chaired the Committee on Banking and Currency from 1932 until 1936, id.,
serving as Vice Chairman and then Chairman of the “Pecora Committee.” Subcommittee
on Senate Resolutions 84 and 234 (The Pecora Committee), SENATE.GOV,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Pecora.htm
(last
visited Aug. 6, 2012). The Pecora Committee was charged with investigating the causes
of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Id. It initiated the reform process that led to passage of
the Securities Act of 1922 and the SEA of 1934, which is also referred to as the
“Fletcher-Rayburn bill.” Id.
230
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231
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232
See id.
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H.R. 9323, 78 CONG. REC. 8160–8203 (May 7, 1934) (statement of Sen. Duncan U.
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securities if they are not willing to tell the truth about those securities? That
is the whole proposition, and all we ask of them is to tell the truth.”235
2. The SEC’s Present-Day Authority: Corporate Governance
As is the case with all agencies, the SEC’s rulemaking power is limited
by its mandate.236 The US Supreme Court has specified that SEC rules
“cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress.”237
Furthermore, while courts have typically upheld disclosure-related
regulations, which are generally considered to be procedural matters, they
have been reticent to uphold laws that directly implicate substantive
matters, which have typically been governed by state corporate law.238 Over
the last twenty years, there appears to have been an increasing struggle to
define the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority.239
In Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the US
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit invalidated a SEC rule barring selfregulatory organizations (SROs)240 from listing corporations that took
corporate action that had “the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately
reducing the per share voting rights of [existing common stockholders].”241
The court reasoned that the SEA “cannot be understood to include
regulation of an issue that is so far beyond matters of disclosure (such as are
regulated under section 14 of the SEA), and of the management and
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practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of
corporate governance traditionally left to the states.”242 Professor Roberta S.
Karmel explains that Congress gave the SEC power over voting procedure,
rather than substantive control of voting power, because “Congress believed
that so long as investors received enough information, shareholder voting
could work . . . .”243 Nonetheless, in Business Roundtable, the court
acknowledged the existence of a “murky area between substance and
procedure.”244
Recent developments in federal regulation of corporate governance
matters, including SOX and Dodd-Frank, can be seen as increasing the
SEC’s regulatory power in such murky areas. Courts today may be wary of
interpreting the SEC’s mandate narrowly given that SOX “has preempted
state law relating to certain aspects of executive compensation and has
broadened the SEC’s overall powers.”245 Professor Karmel views SOX as a
major increase in the scope of the SEC’s regulatory power: “The SEC now
has the leverage to impose its model of corporate governance-a board of
independent directors serving as a check on the CEO; a regulated CFO; and
auditors and attorneys who must divide their allegiance to their clients with
an allegiance to the SEC-on SEC registered corporations.”246
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Dodd-Frank involved additional corporate law changes, introducing more
matters of internal corporate governance into federal law.247 While SOX
required independent directors on the audit committee, Dodd-Frank added a
requirement that boards have a compensation committee, and that such
committee be composed of independent directors.248 With respect to
executive compensation, enhanced disclosure is required as is a nonbinding
shareholder “say-on-pay” vote.249 Another Dodd-Frank provision requires
public companies to disclose split jobs, employing a “comply or explain”
approach.250
To date, the courts have struck down a single SEC rule—Rule 14a-11—
promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank “authorization.”251 Dodd-Frank
authorizes SEC rules “requiring public companies to include nominees
submitted by shareholders.”252 Rule 14a-11 required companies to include
in their proxy materials “the name of a person or persons nominated by a
[qualifying] shareholder or group of shareholders for election to the board
of directors.”253 In adopting Rule 14a-11, the SEC concluded that the rule
“could create potential benefits of improved board and company
performance and shareholder value sufficient to justify [its] potential
costs.”254 The US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, however, found that
the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious and
not in accordance with law”; underscoring the SEC’s obligation to
“consider the effect of a new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital
247
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formation,”255 the court reasoned that the SEC failed to “apprise itself—and
hence the public and Congress—of the economic consequences of a
proposed regulation.”256
Considering the broad reach of SOX and Dodd-Frank, the SEC’s current
regulatory authority appears to be well supported. While the decision to
strike Rule 14a-11 serves as an important reminder that the SEC’s authority
is not without bounds—arbitrary regulations will be disallowed, and
potential economic consequences must be taken into consideration257—a
nonbinding say-on-diversity shareholder vote would fall well within the
established scope of the SEC’s regulatory power.

IV. ITEM FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: POSITIVE LABOR MARKET
EFFECTS?
This section undertakes a preliminary investigation of additional positive
labor market benefits that may flow from increased gender diversity in the
boardroom. A 2008 study surveying forty-three countries revealed,
“countries with a higher representation of women on boards are more likely
to have women in senior management and more equal ratios of male-tofemale pay.”258 Similarly, the FRC has noted that “boards with no, or very
limited, female membership may . . . offer little encouragement to aspiration
among female employees.”259
First, this section discusses the inherent conflict between professional
work and childrearing within our economic structure. Second, it considers
the possibility that women directors might leverage their capacity for
empathy in order to ameliorate such structure. Undoubtedly, the interaction
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between boardroom composition, empathy, and economic structure is an
area for further research.
A. Worker and Mother: A False Dichotomy of Economics?
Professor Douglas M. Branson writes:
Corporate America seems to regard child bearing and child rearing
as just a lifestyle choice that some women make, just as other
women dedicate leisure time to improving their tennis game or to
training for a marathon. Bearing children and raising them well,
however, is not just another lifestyle choice. It is the source of
human capital, a sufficient supply of which is critical to the society
as a whole.260
In terms of workplace equality, it appears that motherhood drastically
reduces a woman’s prospects of achieving such elusive equality. While
childless women earn 90 percent of the pay of men, mothers earn only 60
percent of the pay of fathers.261 The failure of corporations to retain and
promote qualified female employees—what some refer to as women’s
“opting-out” of the labor market—is costly to each individual and society as
whole.262 At the same time, there is an inherent clash between “our ideals at
work” and “our ideals for family life.”263
In an influential New York Times article, “The Opt-Out Revolution,” Lisa
Belkin points out that many employers do recognize that corporate entities
benefit in the long run by offering flexible policies, such as maternity leave
and extended part-time work, thereby successfully retaining employees over
the course of their long-term careers.264 Flexibility plays a key role in the
260
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attainment of a more balanced labor market in which parents can devote
energy to childrearing without sacrificing professional development.265
While female employees, particularly mothers, would most certainly benefit
from more flexible policies, male employees would as well. Interestingly, a
study on flexible work schedules revealed that men and women use flexible
schedules at approximately the same rates—26.7 percent of women and
28.1 percent of men.266
Company surveys reveal that employees generally rate flexible work
arrangements and work-life balance as being “extremely important.”267
Furthermore, one study comparing organizations with high and low levels
of flexibility reported benefits to organizations with higher levels of
flexibility in terms of job engagement, commitment, and satisfaction, as
well as employee retention.268 In spite of the “common sense” of flexible
policies, corporations have failed to broadly institute them.269 Belkin sees
the persistence of rigid policies as stemming from the fact that “male
managers and supervisors tend to see not the long- but the short-run
view.”270
An additionally problematic piece of the puzzle is that standard measures
of economic productivity fail to account for a whole range of activities
integral to our day-to-day well-being and to the creation of our next-
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generation of human capital. Ann Crittenden, a former New York Times
reporter, summarizes this dilemma: “Child rearing and household
management are considered to have no economic or job-enabling value.”271
Interestingly, the well-known economic measure, Gross National Product
(GNP), was not developed until the 1930s,272 during the same time period in
which Congress legislated the SEA and created the SEC.273 In his 1934
report to Congress, Simon Kuznets, the Nobel Prize-winning statistician
responsible for developing GNP, warned that “the welfare of a nation”
could “scarcely be inferred” from GNP.274
This is an area for further exploration. Ultimately, it is the board of
directors that wields the power to set broad company policies, including
those related to employment. In this respect, the power of managers and
supervisors, which Belkin discusses, is directly circumscribed by corporate
policies.275 One cannot help but ask whether a critical mass of women
directors might influence the labor market in ways that would reduce
gender-based inequities.
B. The Impact of Women Directors: “Signaling” and Empathy
There has been a good deal of discussion on the “signaling” function of
women in positions of leadership.276 Specifically, with regard to the
271
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corporate arena, studies show that “the more women there are in director
positions, the greater the number of women in senior management
positions.”277 At least one study has found “a positive relationship between
female corporate board members and the following: number of women
officers; number of women officers holding line jobs; presence of a critical
mass of women officers; women officers with high-ranking or ‘clout’ titles;
and women among the top corporate earners.”278
There are additional arguments that gender diversity benefits
corporations and their shareholders due to inherent or acculturated
differences in the genders. It has been suggested, for example, that
“diversity increases creativity and innovation as these characteristics are not
randomly distributed in the population, but tend to vary systematically with
demographic variables such as gender.”279 While such arguments are
potentially problematic—either because of their empirical ambiguity or
because of their potential for misuse—they may also enable corporations to
better leverage the available pool of human capital.
One particularly interesting argument, which stems from psychological
literature, relates to women’s capacity for empathy. Assuming that women
have a comparative advantage in terms of their capacity for empathy,
women directors might be inclined to advocate for more flexible corporate
employment policies (here, also assuming a critical mass of women
directors).
Within the field of psychology, empathy is divided into two groupings:
cognitive, which involves “perspective taking,”280 and emotional, which
277
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involves “concern for the other.”281 In other words, “[c]ognitive role-taking
consists of a primarily intellectual process and involves social skills and
social perceptiveness, whereas emotional empathy consists of a more basic
or ‘primitive’ level of interpersonal process whereby . . . one responds with
emotions similar to those of others who are present.”282
Numerous studies have found that women score higher than men on tests
of empathy.283 A recent Spanish study employed a longitudinal design in an
adolescent population to research whether women have a greater “empathic
disposition” as compared with men.284 Girls scored higher both in terms of
cognitive and emotional empathy.285 The study concluded, “sex differences
are not just found in the emotional realm of empathy but also in the capacity
of understanding the other person’s state and situation.”286 Such finding is
noteworthy with respect to boardroom diversity because directors’ exercise
of cognitive empathy might be particularly impactful in shaping corporate
employment policies.
To date, there is at least some evidence that women directors “feel that
their presence makes the board more sensitive to women’s issues.”287 Given
such findings on women’s “empathic disposition,” it would be interesting to
pursue further research on how such disposition affects the nature of
women’s professional accomplishments when women are in positions of
power.
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CONCLUSION
This article is intended to spark debate and further research on the topic
of gender diversity in the boardroom. Despite significant educational and
professional attainment, within the boardrooms of America’s Fortune 500
companies, women represent a mere 16.1 percent of directors.288 Just three
companies in the S&P 500 Index have boards on which women directors
hold more than 40 percent of board seats,289 while forty-seven companies
have no female directors at all.290
In leveraging both interdisciplinary research and experiences from
abroad, this article has sought to develop a more holistic picture of the
factors contributing to the low ratio of women to men on corporate boards.
The hope is that such a contextualized discussion of women directors will
foster support for increased gender diversity amongst a broad cross section
of individuals and organizations.
Focusing on the “business case” for gender diversity in the boardroom, it
is apparent that meaningful gender diversity is advantageous in economic
terms. Research into critical mass theory suggests that the male-to-female
director ratio must be increased significantly in order for corporations,
shareholders, and the overall economy to reap the rewards of gender
diversity in the boardroom.
Particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been renewed debate
and substantially increased SEC regulation focused on the securities market.
Building on the SEC’s 2010 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, and
considering both the SEC’s origins and its present day regulatory role, this
article suggests a more robust version of the current disclosure
requirements. Such an amended disclosure requirement ought to (1) define
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“diversity” to explicitly include gender diversity, (2) require corporations to
have a diversity policy in place and to disclose such policy to shareholders,
and (3) potentially require a nonbinding “say-on-diversity” shareholder
vote. The direct benefits of such an enhanced requirement would include
increased corporate accountability to investors and greater likelihood that
corporations would realize the increased economic gains associated with
gender diversity in the boardroom. Finally, in terms of indirect benefits,
there is the possibility that such a requirement could lead to broader societal
benefits in terms of positive labor market effects.

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 1 • 2012

391

